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THE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT COMPLIANCE JOB:
DESCRIPTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE
Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto*
Universities have an absolute obligation as NCAA members to
maintain control of their athletic programs. These programs are highly
visible, highly scrutinized, and highly criticized when something goes
wrong. Institutional compliance directors investigate and report NCAA
violations. They also oversee incidents involving student-athlete behavioral issues, and they are the athletic department liaisons to the greater
campus. Scrutiny and criticism of athletic programs necessarily extends
to scrutiny of their work.
This article describes the nuts and bolts of the institutional compliance job. It then focuses on a prime impediment to effective compliance
risk management—the failure of those with information about violations
to report that information to the compliance director. Finally, it offers
guidance on how to increase the likelihood of reports being made. It
also sets forth the minimal requisites of a violation investigation, and the
prime elements of a compliance risk management plan.

* Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto is the Richard H. Larson Professor of Constitutional Law at
the University of Nebraska College of Law. From 1999 to 2020 she served as the university’s
faculty athletics representative (FAR), a required campus position at all National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) member institutions. Among NCAA committee service relevant to the subject of this article, Potuto served nine years as a member of the Committee on
Infractions (COI) (two years as Chair); more than four years on the Division I Management
Council, including service on both its Legislative Review and Administrative Review Subcommittees; and five years as a member of the Division I Interpretations Committee. She also
served on special NCAA task forces, including the NCAA Division I Interpretative Process
Working Group, which evaluated the intersection between infractions and interpretations processes; and the NCAA Special Review Committee, which evaluated and made operational a
special consultant’s report on enforcement and infractions. She served as well as a representative of the COI on the NCAA enforcement experience project, designed to educate media
representatives on how the enforcement/infractions process works. While her experience informs the views expressed in this Article, she does not speak for any NCAA committee.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA) is a member-driven private association of four-year post-high-school educational
institutions1 that administers championships and regulates intercollegiate athletics competition.2 Its bylaws cover rules of the game, team

1. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2019-2020 DIVISION I MANUAL Art. 4, §
4.02.1 (2019) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
2. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 1.2.
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staffing limits, and coach and student-athlete deportment.3 Because conduct by and concerning student-athletes off the field can impact competition on the field, NCAA bylaws also cover student-athlete academic
performance and integrity and the off-field conduct of athletes, staff, and
boosters.4
NCAA bylaws and policies operate directly only on NCAA member institutions.5 An obvious requirement of membership is that member
institutions must comply with the NCAA Constitution, bylaws, and policies.6 Another requirement of NCAA membership is the cooperative
principle. Pursuant to the cooperative principle, NCAA member institutions must cooperate in uncovering, investigating, and reporting violations.7
Universities act only through the people for whom they are responsible. That means universities meet their obligations of rules compliance
and investigative cooperation by enforcing those obligations on their
coaches, other staff members, and student-athletes.8 Coaches, staff
members, and student-athletes annually certify to their rules compliance
and acknowledge their obligation to report violations.9
3. E.g., NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Art. 17, Art. 18.
4. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Art. 16 (prohibiting payments and other benefits
provided to student-athletes); NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Art. 14 (governing academic
eligibility to compete); NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Art. 13 (governing conduct with
recruits, including inducements); NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Art. 15 (governing financial aid). Boosters include individuals who make donations to get season tickets, make financial contributions to athletic departments, or help to promote university athletics. See NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 1, § 6.4.2 (Representatives of Athletics Interests). Role of Boosters,
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/role-boosters (last visited Aug. 17, 2020).
5. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 1.3.2, 2.1.2, 2.8
6. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 2.8, 19.2.1. See also NCAA MANUAL, supra note
1 (The Commitment to Institutional Control and Compliance).
7. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 19.2.3, 19.01.3.
8. The focus of this article is on how compliance directors achieve effective monitoring
and processing of violations to assure a rules compliant institutional environment. Outside the
scope of this article, because it is outside the job responsibility of compliance directors, is a
critically important component to achieving rules compliance—the establishment by highlevel university and athletic administrators of a positive environment for staff and studentathletes, one that reinforces and provides incentives for acting in ethical, rules-abiding ways.
Also critically important, and outside the scope of this article is the hiring and student-athlete
reinstatement process. The best assurance of rules compliance is a work force and studentathletes who embody ethical behavior.
9. Coaches and staff annually execute a Certification of Compliance by which they certify that they have no knowledge of any violations. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§
3.2.4.16, 18.4.2.1.1. The obligation to be rules compliant also is included in coach contracts.
Student-athletes annually execute a Student-Athlete Statement. See infra note 33. Staff members and student-athletes commit unethical conduct by refusing to “furnish information relevant to an investigation of a possible violation of an NCAA regulation when requested to do
so” and by “[k]nowingly furnishing . . . false or misleading information concerning . . . involvement in or knowledge of matters relevant to a possible violation of an NCAA regulation.” NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 10.1(a), (c).
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II. THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPLIANCE JOB: IN GENERAL
Institutional compliance directors perform the central risk management prevention functions of rules education and monitoring bylaw
compliance to prevent violations.10 They handle rules interpretation11
and the process of seeking waivers from the operation of bylaws.12 They
are the athletic department’s point person for investigating potential bylaw violations and reporting to the NCAA enforcement staff when violations are committed.13 To do all these jobs properly, institutional compliance directors must be knowledgeable about NCAA bylaws and
policies, as well as bylaw interpretations and amplifying educational material that give scope and content to the black letter of a bylaw.
In most ways, the work of institutional compliance directors supports and facilitates the objectives of staff and student-athletes. Both
rules education and rules interpretation assist coaches and staff to forestall the commission of violations. Waivers, when successful, permit
student-athletes and staff to engage in conduct that otherwise would constitute a violation. Interpretative efforts also often result in finding a
rules-compliant way for coaches and staff to achieve their objectives.14
Compliance directors necessarily are a Janus,15 however, with the
educational/interpretative face being friendly and supportive and the
monitoring/investigative face being skeptical and potentially adversarial. To be successful in effective oversight, compliance directors must
forge positive working relationships with coaches and other staff and
establish and maintain informal channels of communication grounded in
10. See ROBERT R. MOELLER, COSO ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 58-60, 68-70,
210 (2d ed. 2011). It also is a byproduct of new laws; new technology; changes in the economy; and evolving social mores, interactions, and priorities. Id. at 67-68. Reputational risk is
triggered by both external and internal events. See id. at 210.
11. For an overview of the NCAA interpretations process, see NCAA MANUAL, supra
note 1, §§ 5.4.1, 5.4.1.2.
12. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 14.02.16. When there is no committee with
subject matter authority over a waiver, waivers are handled by the Committee for Legislative
Relief. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 5.4.1.3.
13. The NCAA enforcement staff investigates bylaw violations and the COI adjudicates
them. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Art. 19. The compliance director also is the liaison between the university and the NCAA enforcement staff when a Level I or Level II violation is processed. See E-mail from Jamie Vaughn, Exec. Assoc. Athletic Dir. for Compliance, Univ. of Neb. Athletics, to Josephine R. Potuto, Professor of Law & Faculty Athletics
Representative, Univ. of Neb. (Mar. 7, 2020, 1:12 PM) (on file with author). See infra note
20 for a discussion of the hierarchy of NCAA violations. The email from Vaughn also demonstrates that the FAR has oversight of this process. Email, Jamie Vaughn, supra.
14. For information on the NCAA process, see INTERPRETATION REQUEST FORM FOR
NCAA DIVISION I INTERPRETATIONS COMMITTEE, https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Interpretation%20Request%20Form%2042715.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2020).
15. Janus, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Janus-Roman-god (last visited Aug. 14, 2020).
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an atmosphere of trust. At the same time, monitoring involves double
checking and verifying information; at least some staff perceive these
monitoring efforts as compliance staff mistrust of them. The potential
for conflict between compliance directors and those monitored, moreover, can become a real conflict even with requests for bylaw interpretations. On occasion, coaches or others attempt to pressure or wheedle
compliance directors to provide a convenient interpretation or to resolve
an inquiry more quickly and on less evidence than they think is warranted.16
A full-blown investigation of a coach or other staff member for
complicity in the commission of serious NCAA violations, characterized
as Level I or Level II, can be explicitly adversarial, even confrontational,
as an investigation can end with negative job consequences for coaches
and other athletic staff and NCAA penalties for them, student-athletes,
particular athletic teams, and for the athletic department.17
Individuals who are penalized may be popular within the athletic
department. Scholarship limits and other team penalties may lead to losing seasons. Athletic department staff, and those outside the athletics
department, may blame a compliance director for producing these impacts.18 They also may view the compliance director as disloyal to coworkers and unconcerned about the impacts that are caused.
The obvious relational impact will be between compliance staff and
those investigated. But the post-investigative aftermath also may have a
negative impact on the relationship between the compliance staff and
16. See Jeff Eisenberg, Toughest jobs in sports: NCAA enforcement staff member,
YAHOO! SPORTS (July 27, 2014, 9:38 AM), https://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/ncaab-the-dagger/toughest-jobs-in-sports—ncaa-enforcement-staff-member-163826437.html; see generally
ENFORCEMENT
SELF-STUDY:
OPERATIONS
AND
COMPLIANCE,
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/EWG%20self-study_052616(final).pdf (last visited
Sept. 30, 2020).
17. There are four classifications of NCAA violations. Level I violations are the most
serious. They provide or are intended to provide a substantial recruiting or competitive advantage or substantial impermissible benefits. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 19.1.1. Examples are academic fraud and cash payments to a recruit that result in the recruit’s enrollment
at an institution. Level II violations provide more than a minimal but less than a substantial
recruiting or competitive advantage or impermissible benefit. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1,
§ 19.1.2. Level IV violations are technical violations. An example is the failure to have all
required documents (SAT score, high school transcript, etc.) filed before a prospect takes an
official visit, when all the documents substantively are sufficient and ultimately were filed.
See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 13.6.3. Level IV violations are handled by Conference
offices. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 19.11.2, 19.12.2. For a description of Level III
violations, see infra note 47.
18. See, e.g., Sam Blum, ‘They gotta point the finger at somebody’: Ex-Stephen F. Austin
compliance leader says he’s not to blame for NCAA issues, DALL. MORNING NEWS (May 20,
2020, 5:49 PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/sports/college-sports/2020/05/20/they-gottapoint-the-finger-at-somebody-former-stephen-f-austin-compliance-leader-argues-hes-not-toblame-for-ncaa-issues/.
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those not the target of an investigation.19 Rebuilding the harmonious
relationship needed for the compliance part of the compliance job may
be difficult. Some relationships may be irrevocably broken.
Having a fully engaged individual outside athletics with oversight
of compliance is an important way to ameliorate both the real time and
downstream consequences that aspects of the compliance job, and particularly investigations, can have on the relationship between compliance staff and others in the athletic department. That person can take
responsibility for unpopular investigative decisions. To be most helpful,
that person needs to have a close understanding of NCAA bylaws and
NCAA national office operations and also must know and be known by
athletic department coaches and other staff. That person should have
regular communication with the compliance staff and sufficient time to
do oversight effectively. Engaging with athletics only when Level I or
Level II violations are uncovered is problematic; effective oversight is
not achieved post hoc.
At the University of Nebraska, the outside person is the faculty athletic representative (FAR),20 a position required by the NCAA Constitution.21 The compliance director promptly reports to the FAR all
19. Their myriad roles can be stressful to manage, and, when in a monitoring or investigative mode, compliance staff can feel isolated. Architecture has an impact. Compliance staff
should be located in the heart of athletics activities, ideally near the training table and academic support. In addition, academic staff, including tutors, should be housed together. They
should not be housed with the athletic team with which they work. Loyalties may be misplaced. The opportunity for cross-pollination and support is reduced.
20. The Nebraska FAR description: The Nebraska FAR is charged by the chancellor to
provide active and close oversight of athletics. She has dotted line oversight of compliance
and solid line oversight of athletics academic services which, at Nebraska, includes academic
standards and integrity, and admissions and eligibility matters. She is the liaison between the
chancellor and the compliance and athletics academic services staffs. She signs off on, and on
occasion writes, Nebraska self-reports of violations to the Conference and to the NCAA, requests for waivers of the application of a Conference rule or NCAA bylaw, and formal requests for bylaw interpretation. She is informed at a preliminary stage of all matters that might
be a major violation, those that affect a high-profile sport or athlete, and others that are identified as raising sensitive issues. She participates in decisions as to the direction and scope of
investigations and, at her discretion, decides the extent of her active involvement, including
whether to participate in interviews. She is the point person on legislative proposals. She
chairs the UNL Chancellor’s Intercollegiate Athletics Review Committee (other members are
the University General Counsel and the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs), which, if
needed, would handle exclusively external (to athletics) the investigation and processing of
an NCAA major infractions case or other major athletics issue. See Harvey Perlman, Establishment of the Intercollegiate Athletics Review Comm., UNIV. NEBRASKA-LINCOLN (July 11,
2004), https://www.unl.edu/chancellor/establishment-intercollegiate-athletics-review-committee [hereinafter Memorandum from UNL Chancellor].
21. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 4.02, 6.1.3. There is good reason for a FAR to be
the individual with outside oversight of athletics. The FAR typically is a tenured member of
the faculty. Part of a faculty member’s job is to test hypotheses and be skeptical. Faculty
interact with students, understand how they operate and also have informal lines of
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potential violations, student-athlete well-being and behavioral issues,
and projected waiver requests.22 The compliance director and the FAR
consult regarding what action should be taken. When interviews of staff
or student-athletes are warranted, the compliance director and FAR typically conduct them together.23
In sum, then, an effective compliance system requires not only an
informed and experienced compliance director, but also engaged outside
oversight. Effective oversight for an athletics department, moreover,
cannot stop with oversight of potential NCAA violations. The outside
person also must oversee, or at least be informed of, all matters that touch
on student-athlete behavioral and wellbeing issues.
Issues involving student-athletes or coaches may overlap several
substantive areas (NCAA violations, Title IX misconduct, criminal conduct, coach misbehavior, student-athlete well-being, campus discipline
or risk assessment, etc.). A question regarding a coach’s interactions
with student-athletes on a team may implicate NCAA violations but also
institutional human resources policies. Unless there is one central place,
one responsible party in receipt of all information, no matter the subject
area, a larger, perhaps more ominous, picture may be obscured. It is
lethal for effective oversight if different people have parts of a story, but
no one has the full story.
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPLIANCE JOB: COMPONENTS
The institutional compliance job has many components. Part III
lists the major components of the job, and then describes the prime ways
that compliance directors go about doing them.
A. Compliance Forms
Much of the day-to-day compliance function revolves around reviewing forms created to help monitor compliance with NCAA

communication with them. Faculty are familiar with campus processes. Faculty are less troubled by hierarchical structures and more willing to challenge authority. Tenured faculty have
job security. A FAR adds to that set of characteristics the fact that she is familiar with NCAA
bylaws and processes, and knows people in the athletic department, the Conference Office,
and the NCAA national office. She already is the eyes and ears of the campus president.
22. Memorandum from UNL Chancellor, supra note 20. The FAR also is informed of
student-athlete Title IX and criminal conduct as well as HR issues involving coaches and other
staff. See generally NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND
PERSPECTIVES OF NCAA FACULTY ATHLETICS REPRESENTATIVES 35 (2013),
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/FAR_STUDY_Report_final.pdf.
23. If the FAR believes that an investigation should be conducted outside athletics, the
FAR can convene the Chancellor’s Intercollegiate Athletics Review Committee. See Memorandum from UNL Chancellor, supra note 20.
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bylaws.24 Coaches must report compliance with play/practice limits.25
Student-athletes must complete the student-athlete statement26 and drug
test permission forms.27 There are squad lists and eligibility certification
forms to be completed.28 There is paperwork involving financial aid offers, awards, renewals, and terminations.29 There are forms governing
student-athlete outside competition,30 forms filed prior to prospective
student-athlete official visits and forms filed subsequent to those visits.31
Compliance staff manage forms related to student-athlete use of the
transfer portal.32 They track complimentary football tickets33 and student-athlete requests for, and payments from, the student-athlete assistance fund.34
Creating and reviewing forms is an important part of monitoring for
rules compliance, but it is only part of that job. People can make mistakes or lie on a form just as they can in an interview.35 Monitoring
requires at least spot checking to assure the accuracy of information
24. See, e.g., 2020-21 Division I Compliance Forms, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/201920-division-i-compliance-forms (last visited Aug. 17, 2020). There also are forms generated
by institutional policy that compliance directors monitor in conjunction with the FAR and the
Director of Athletic Academic Services.
25. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Art. 17. Many athletic departments now use Teamworks or other software to monitor play/practice bylaw compliance and other student-athlete
time demands. See E-mail from Jonathan Bateman, Assoc. Dir. of Compliance, Univ. of Neb.
Athletics, to Josephine R. Potuto, Professor of Law & Faculty Athletics Representative, Univ.
of Neb. (Mar. 20, 2020, 10:21 AM) (on file with author); Elite Compliance Webinar, Front
Rush (training on practice logs, declaring play/practice season, etc.) (on file with author).
26. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 3.2.4.6, 3.2.4.7, 12.7.2; NCAA Division 1 StudentAthlete Statement Form 19-1a, NCAA, https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/compliance/d1/2019-20D1Comp_Form19-1a-StudentAthleteStatement.pdf (last visited Sept. 19,
2020). The student-athlete statement has six parts. Among other things, student-athletes attest
that they have not violated NCAA rules, are eligible to compete, and are amateurs. Id.
27. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 15.5.11.3.
28. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 15.5.11. For a list of compliance forms required by
the NCAA, see 2020-21 Division I Compliance Forms, supra note 24.
29. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 15.3.4, 15.3.5, 15.3.7. For an example of a form
notifying a student-athlete of a financial aid termination, see E-mail and attachment from Lisa
Dority, Athletic Scholarship Coordinator, Univ. of Neb., to Darien Chase, Student Athlete,
Univ. of Neb. (Feb. 28, 2020, 4:32 PM) (on file with author).
30. See Outside Competition Form (on file with author). Outside competition refers to
competitions in which student-athletes compete as individuals and not as members of a university team. National and Olympic competition is outside competition.
31. The forms include an Official Visit Report (on file with author); Official Visit Guidelines (on file with author); Student Host Guidelines (on file with author); Official Visit Checklist (on file with author).
32. See NCAA Overview of Four-Year College Transfer Data and NCAA Transfer Portal Data (on file with author).
33. See Student-Athlete Complimentary Admission Request Form (on file with author).
34. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 16.11.1.8; 2019-20 Student-Athlete Assistance
Fund Policies and Procedures (on file with author).
35. See, e.g., U. MICH., INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 333 at 6, (Nov. 4, 2010); U. IND.,
BLOOMINGTON, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 287 at 3 (Nov. 25, 2008).
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recorded on a form. Consider play/practice logs. Compliance directors
use these to monitor team compliance with NCAA limits on daily and
weekly required athletic participation. On occasion, and without prior
notice, compliance staff should watch a practice or talk to student-athletes or facilities staff about the length of time a team practiced. These
spot checks may surface violations not recorded on a form. A coach who
knows that these spot checks will occur likely will be more observant of
play/practice rules and also exercise more care in completing the forms.
B. Rules Education
Compliance staff educate coaches, staff, student-athletes, and
boosters on bylaws that affect them .36 Student-athletes typically receive
in-person rules training at the beginning of each academic year, head
coaches receive rules training at monthly compliance meetings,37 and
other staff and boosters receive training as needed. Rules education also
includes information on new bylaw interpretations and information bearing on bylaw scope and meaning that arises out of infractions or waiver
cases. Compliance staff also are responsible for tracking proposed bylaw additions and revisions and spearheading the institutional process
for developing athletic department positions on them.
C. Rules Interpretation
Language is not self-defining. Even bylaw language that seems
clear in the black letter may be opaque as to its application to particular
situations.38 Contrary to most legal systems, where the body that adjudicates a violation of a rule also interprets the rule allegedly violated, the

36. See E-mail from Jonathan Bateman, Assoc. Dir. of Compliance, Univ. of Neb., to
Josephine R. Potuto, Professor of Law & Faculty Athletics Representative, Univ. of Neb.
(Feb. 20, 2020, 11:19 AM) (on file with author). Rules education also is directed at those
outside athletics with association with athletics. Id. These may include corporate sponsors, the
university bookstore, and instructors with student-athletes in their classes. Id. Between June
2018 and December 2019, the rules education for student-athletes at the University of Nebraska entailed three in-person meetings, eight compliance subjects summarized on TV monitors in athletics, and ten emails on different compliance subjects. Id. Compliance information
also is included in a student-athlete planner distributed to all student-athletes. Id.
37. See Agenda for Univ. of Neb. Head Coaches Meeting (Sept. 11, 2019, 12:00 PM)
(on file with author). For an agenda of a monthly head coach meeting, see (602A) NCAA and
Conference Regulations Review, KAN. ATHLETICS, https://kuathletics.com/602a-ncaa-andconference-regulations-review/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2020).
38. In consequence, all legal systems provide for controlling interpretations of existing
language of a statute or rule when that language is challenged as insufficiently clear in application.

96

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:61

NCAA interpretations process operates separately from the adjudicative
process. 39
Interpretations begin on campus, with questions directed at compliance staff most often from coaches, but also from other staff, studentathletes, and occasionally a booster. They know what they want to do,
but they may not know which facts will be critical to separating conduct
that is rules-compliant from that which is rules-violative. Their descriptions of projected action may be imprecise or incomplete. On occasion,
moreover, they may attempt to direct a specific response by very carefully crafting the question that they ask.
Compliance staff need to be sure that they have full information
before answering a question. They should always ask if there is action
contemplated beyond what has been described. They also must clearly
state to the person who asked the question that their answer is specific to
the facts provided and only to those facts. The person who asked the
question must understand that any deviation from those described facts
triggers another consultation with compliance staff.
Although each member of a compliance staff typically has clear
subject areas of responsibility, the nature of compliance work means that
these lines blur and also that, on occasion, another staff member must
field a question because the compliance staff member with that specific
responsibility is unavailable. In consequence, compliance protocols
should assure that all staff are made aware of questions asked and information provided and that, before answering a question, a compliance
staff member should ascertain whether another compliance member already answered it.
Sometimes a head coach asks a question in the hope that the bylaw
language does not mean what it plainly says. At other times a head coach
believes another university is interpreting the language differently, and
this belief prompts an “interpretative” request.40 This type of question
takes little time to answer, often requiring nothing more than a straightforward recitation of bylaw language.
When bylaw language is unclear in its application to particular
facts, compliance staff will confirm their reading of a bylaw’s scope and
impact by checking NCAA interpretations posted on the NCAA
39. In part, that is because the NCAA system has an enforcement adjudicatory arm—the
Committee on Infractions—but no equivalent interpretative adjudicatory arm. For a complete
description of the NCAA interpretations process, see NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 5.4.1;
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at. fig. 5-1 (NCAA Division I Legislative Process); NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 1, at fig. 5-1 (Legislative Activity Calendar).
40. Interpretation Request Form for NCAA Division I Interpretation Committee, NCAA,
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Interpretation%20Request%20Form%2042715.pdf
(last visited Aug. 19, 2020).
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legislative services database (LSDBi).41 On occasion, they consult with
Conference or NCAA staff.42 Most often, the process ends with an
NCAA staff response.43 In rare cases, compliance directors appeal a
staff decision and seek a formal interpretative answer from the NCAA
Interpretations Committee.44
D. Waivers
Institutional compliance staff seek waivers from the operation of a
bylaw when they believe that conduct falls within the letter of a bylaw
but not its intent.45 Waivers often involve a student-athlete’s eligibility
to compete, where time is of the essence and coaches have high interest
and want quick results.46 In consequence, handling a waiver request can
be stressful.
A compliance director’s first move in a waiver request is to direct
a question to NCAA staff assigned to, and following guidelines set by,
the NCAA committee with jurisdiction over the bylaw for which the
waiver is sought. 47 Should a waiver be denied, institutional compliance
41. The LSDBi includes legislative proposals, infractions reports, interpretations, and
waivers. See LSDBi Database, NCAA, https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/ (last visited Aug. 19,
2020). A copy of the information summary, and a sample interpretations page, are on file in
the office of Josephine R. Potuto.
42. See E-mail from Jamie Vaughn, Exec. Assoc. Athletic Dir. for Compliance, Univ. of
Neb. Athletics, to Athletics Head Coaches & Assistant Coaches, Univ. of Neb. Athletics (Oct.
14, 2019, 4:44 PM) (on file with author). A prime responsibility of the NCAA Membership
Affairs staff is to interpret bylaws. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 5.4.1.2.1. For an illustration of the NCAA model of analysis, see generally NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS,
INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 265 (2007) (West Virginia University); NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON
INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 163 11-12 (1999) (University of Notre Dame).
Compliance staff also may seek guidance from compliance administrators at the Conference
Office.
43. These interpretations are not published, and may be relied on only by the institution
involved. When an interpretative request has broader implications and potentially more farreaching consequences, a decision is referred to the Interpretations Committee and ultimately
published. All these decisions are reviewed by the Division I Legislation Committee. See
NCAA DIV. 1 INTERPRETATIONS COMM., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (2019).
44. These answers typically resolve the appeal. They are reviewed by the Division I legislative committee. If approved, they then are published on the NCAA website. See NCAA
DIV. 1 INTERPRETATIONS COMM., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (2019).
45. See Waivers, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/content-categories/eligibility/waivers
(last visited Sept. 30, 2020).
46. See, e.g., Remaining Eligible: Academic Waivers, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/remaining-eligible-academic-waivers (last visited Sept. 30, 2020).
47. Committees with responsibility for particular bylaws consider waivers specific to the
bylaws for which they have responsibility. Such bylaw responsibility includes waivers of team
CAP rules, NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 23.1, validation of academic records of prospective student-athletes, NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 14.1.2.1, 14.1.2.2, and initial and
continuing eligibility of individual student-athletes, NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§
14.3.1.5, 14.4.3.6. Although the NCAA provides no general set of policies and procedures
governing all committees, each committee has published policies and procedures governing
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staff may appeal the decision to the applicable committee.48 The waiver
and appeal process are handled online.49
E. NCAA Violations
Institutional staff members, boosters, and student-athletes can commit NCAA violations.50 Each of their violations also is an institutional
violation.51 If the Committee on Infractions (COI)52 concludes that institutional monitoring and oversight were not reasonably calculated to
prevent and uncover violations, then it will penalize the institution for a
failure to monitor its athletic programs53 or for a more general lack of
institutional control.54
Institutional and staff culpability for violations is resolved through
the infractions process; Level I and Level II violations typically result in
in-person, adversarial hearings before the COI.55
Institutional
its operations. See, e.g., Student-Athlete Reinstatement, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/compliance/reinstatement/student-athlete-reinstatement (last visited Aug. 19, 2020).
48. See, e.g., NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.8.4.1.1.
49. Example of Filed Waiver (on file with author).
50. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 2.8.1.
51. Institutional responsibility tracks the law of respondeat superior in which employers
are liable for intentional torts of employees that arise out of the employment relationship when
the employee acts, or intends to act, in furtherance of the employer’s interests. CLARK
BOARDMAN CALLAGHAN, 54 CAUSES OF ACTION 255 § 2 (2d ed. 2020). To some degree,
institutional responsibility in NCAA processes also tracks agency principles that make it unfair for an enterprise to benefit from the work of its agents and yet not be responsible when
they cause harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1958). Under general agency law, principals are not responsible when their agents act solely
in their own self-interest. Id. § 23. By virtue of the institutional control mandate, NCAA institutions are responsible for the conduct of staff and others beyond what agency principles
dictate. At the same time, NCAA coach and staff misconduct is typically directed at team
success. That success inures to the benefit of the athletic department even when it also injures
the department because of violation of NCAA bylaws.
52. The COI adjudicates institutional and staff violations. See infra note 54 and accompanying text for the jurisdiction of the COI and how it works.
53. See, e.g., NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 262,
15-18 (2006) (University of Kansas); NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS
REPORT NO. 191, 12-13 (2001) (Marshall University); NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON
INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 287 (2016) (University of Notre Dame).
54. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 2.8.1. See, e.g., NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON
INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 192, 20-24 (2002) (University of Kentucky).
55. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 19.7.7. The COI makes factual findings and writes
full infractions reports explaining the reasons for its findings and penalties. NCAA MANUAL,
supra note 1, § 19.8.1. Ancillary to its responsibility to resolve cases, the COI oversees scheduling of cases before it and resolves procedural issues, including those directed at the conduct
of enforcement staff. Procedural matters must be raised prior to or during an infractions hearing or else they are waived. They are resolved at the hearing, see, e.g., INFRACTIONS REPORT
NO. 265, supra note 42, at 37-43, or in a separate hearing preceding the hearing on the merits,
see, e.g., NCAA D1 COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 256 (March 10,
2006) (Ohio State University). Two other COI responsibilities are to determine whether cases
offered for processing through summary disposition may be so resolved or require a full
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culpability for less serious violations, characterized as Level III,56 is handled by the NCAA enforcement staff based on the investigation and selfreport of institutional compliance staff; the enforcement staff conduct no
independent investigation.57 Student-athlete culpability for all violations
is resolved through the student-athlete reinstatement process, which mirrors the process for handling institutional culpability for Level III violations.58 The responsibility of the Reinstatement Committee and staff is
limited to assessing a student-athlete’s responsibility based on information that the institutional compliance director provides and then deciding the conditions to be imposed before a student-athlete will be reinstated to competition eligibility.59
F. The Compliance Job Beyond NCAA Bylaws
Compliance staff monitor institutional athletic policies60 as well as
those of the athletic conference to which a member institution belongs.
When student-athletes or athletic staff are the focus, the head compliance
director also may have monitoring responsibility even though the policies enforced are not those of the NCAA, conference, or institutional
athletic department. Some aspects of student-athlete well-being are covered by NCAA bylaws,61 but many others are not. On occasion, and
particularly when the issue is coach treatment of student-athletes, there
may be an overlap with institutional human resources policies. Institutional compliance staff sometimes also participate in these inquiries.
hearing, NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 32.7, and to appear before the IAC to respond to
appeals. This latter function is handled by the two COI coordinators of appeals. NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 1, § 19.1.1.4.
56. Level III violations are isolated and inadvertent and produce only limited competitive
advantage. For these, no independent NCAA investigation takes place. Instead, NCAA staff
rely on the investigation and fact findings of institutional compliance staff. NCAA MANUAL,
supra note 1, § 19.1.4.
57. For a general description of handling Level III violations, see NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 19.12.
58. For a full discussion of the NCAA reinstatement process, see Josephine R. Potuto,
The NCAA Student-Athlete Reinstatement Process: Say What?, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 297 (2015).
Student-athlete violations render a student-athlete ineligible until reinstated through the
NCAA student-athlete reinstatement process. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 14.11.1,
14.11.2, 14.12.
59. For reinstatement purposes, consequences to student-athletes are not called “penalties.” Instead, they are called “reinstatement conditions.” See supra note 56 and accompanying
text.
60. At Nebraska, for example, the athletic academic services staff, compliance staff, and
the FAR track instructors with a relationship with athletics who have student-athletes in their
classes. See E-mail from Leah Huber, Administrative Assistant to Athletic Dir., Univ. of Neb.
Athletics, to Josephine R. Potuto, Professor of Law & Faculty Athletics Representative, Univ.
of Neb. (Mar. 3, 2020) (on file with author).
61. Bylaws that limit the hours a student-athlete may play or practice are an example.
See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Art. 17.
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The head compliance director also may be the staff member in the
athletic department who interacts with the campus Title IX administrator, campus threat assessment team, campus police, campus student discipline and academic misconduct offices, and city police. In these cases,
the compliance director does not investigate but acts as liaison, facilitates
information acquisition and scheduling, and also evaluates whether the
conduct may violate NCAA bylaws and, therefore, ultimately require a
compliance investigation.62 The laws and policies that may apply to student-athlete conduct or that of athletic department staff include not only
Title IX,63 but also the Clery Act,64 federal criminal statutes, state criminal statutes, county and city ordinances, and university/regents/trustees
policies.
G. Compliance Directors as Athletic Department Senior Staff
Compliance directors are part of the athletic department’s senior
executive staff. Senior executive staff members typically are assigned
athletic teams to supervise. Sports supervisors oversee head coaches and
also manage team budget requests, team travel, and day-to-day team organizational and operational matters that may arise. Sports supervision
adds time demands to an already time-intensive compliance job, and it
further complicates the conflict between a compliance director’s cooperative and investigative roles.65 This conflict is particularly acute when
a compliance director, acting as sports supervisor, has factual information regarding an investigation or was part of a decision-making process relevant to an investigation.
In a world focused only on compliance and investigative imperatives, compliance directors would not supervise sports. Sports supervision, however, fully integrates a compliance director into an athletic director’s management team, an important goal for an athletic director. In
addition, sports supervision is an important box to check for a compliance director who seeks to move from compliance to general athletic
administration.

62. See Jake New, The ‘Black Hole’ of College Sports, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 9, 2017),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/02/09/baylor-not-alone-shielding-athletes-accused-misconduct-punishment.
63. Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1972).
64. The Clery Act requires universities to maintain crime statistics and report them to
students and staff. Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime
Statistics Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f).
65. For an example of how the pressure of the two roles may affect the compliance responsibility, see INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 287 at 3-4 (2008) (Indiana University, Bloomington).
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If a compliance director supervises sports, there needs to be a written policy on file that describes the protocols that apply to minimize conflicts and the process to be employed when a conflict arises.66 Among
other things, the policy should specify that compliance directors will not
supervise large squad teams or high profile sports. Large squads entail
time and work that compliance directors can ill afford to devote. High
profile sports are likely to trigger more instances in which investigations
may be needed and also enhanced public scrutiny of those investigations.67 In consequence, the responsibility for these investigations must
be in the hands of the compliance director.
IV. IMPEDIMENTS TO RISK MANAGEMENT
No system can avoid all risk because that requires both perfect
knowledge and perfect execution, each unattainable by fallible human
beings over the long haul. Even if perfection were attainable, it comes
at too great a cost. Avoiding major NCAA violations is a substantial
interest of a university and its athletics department, but it is not the only
one. The cost of a full-bore monitoring system will be expensive; the
tradeoff may be cessation of, or limits on, athletic programs or staffing.
A full-bore monitoring system also will be overblown compared to the
type and incidence of most violations that will be committed.68 Costs
aside, no one wants to live or work in a police state, with a compliance
officer watching every move. “Big brother is watching you”69 does not
portend a positive work environment. The NCAA requisites of institutional control mean that a university has systems in place reasonably calculated to detect and report violations, not a system that is calculated to

66. The protocols should specify, for example, that someone in the compliance department other than the compliance director will manage compliance issues for a team the compliance director supervises. The protocols should specify, as another example, that someone
in the compliance department other than the compliance director will be involved if there is
an investigation of team members or staff.
67. See, e.g., Dan Kane, NCAA faces criticism for UNC decision, NEWS&OBSERVER
(Oct. 14, 2017, 9:11 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/sports/college/acc/unc/article178784981.html.
68. There are several systems used to evaluate the type, potential, and likelihood that
violations and misconduct might occur, as well as the potential harm to individuals and the
enterprise. MOELLER, supra note 10, at 43-49. These include brainstorming, use of a group of
experts to ponder potential risks identified to them (called the “oracle” method), a variation
of the oracle method (called the “Delphi” method) in which there is a loop interaction between
the oracles, use of computer models and simulations (called the “Monte Carlo” method), and
finally assessment of risk as interrelated probabilities with the occurrence of one risk making
more likely (or more serious) the occurrence of other risk (called the “decision tree” method).
Id. at 45-49.
69. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, 3 (1983).
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cover every contingency that might happen, no matter the cost to other
important and worthwhile institutional goals and interests.70
A. Failure to Report Suspected Misconduct
A prime component in a system reasonably calculated to detect violations is that individuals with information about violations report what
they know. Yet time and again, individuals fail to report misconduct.
From childhood, people are told not to tattle tale. Athletic staff fear
career impact when what they report implicates a valued employee such
as the head coach of the football team or when it may cause trouble to
an athletic team or program.71 They worry that they will not be believed,72 and they worry about job consequences.73 They likely secondguess themselves.74 They also may think, wrongly, that they have no
responsibility to report because a supervisor also heard the information
or because the information came from someone in another athletic unit.
Their reluctance to report may be amplified by a concern that their report
may cause unwarranted damage to reputation or job prospects because
decision-makers will overreact rather than provide a measured response
to available information.75

70. See Principles of Institutional Control as Prepared by the NCAA Committee on Infraction (on file with author); see also Draft of Standards for Effective Compliance and Risk
Management Programs Maintaining Institutional Control, D-IA Athletics Directors Association Compliance and Enforcement Task Force (June 5, 2013) (on file with author).
71. It is a prime reason that graduate students and untenured faculty members remain
silent about abuse perpetrated by faculty. Kate Clancy, From the Field: Hazed Tells Her Story
of Harassment, SCI. AM. (Jan. 30, 2012), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/context-andvariation/from-the-field-hazed-tells-her-story-of-harassment/; Tom Bartlett & Nell Gluckman, More Women Come Forward to Report Sexual Harassment by Harvard Professor,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 4, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/More-WomenCome-Forward-to/242737. Concern over career consequences also deterred most of Harvey
Weinstein’s accusers from reporting his misconduct when it occurred. Jodi Kantor & Megan
Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html.
72. See Kantor & Twohey, supra note 71.
73. The fear that there will be job consequences is not unfounded. See, e.g., Richard
Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers by Contract, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 975, 977 (2008);
Detlev Nitsch et al., Why Code of Conduct Violations Go Unreported: A Conceptual Framework to Guide Intervention and Future Research, 57 J. BUS. ETHICS 327, 335 (2005).
74. One of Larry Nasser’s victims said, “I’d make excuses” in an attempt to reconcile
conduct she knew was wrong. Dan Barry, Serge F. Kovaleski, & Juliet Macur, As F.B.I. Took
a Year to Pursue the Nassar Case, Dozens Say They Were Molested, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/sports/nassar-fbi.html. For a discussion of Larry
Nassar and the sex abuse scandal at Michigan State University, see infra note 90 and accompanying text.
75. Many believe that this describes the treatment of its men’s lacrosse team and studentathletes by the Duke athletic and campus administration. See, e.g., DON YAEGER & MIKE
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Other impediments to reporting are that those with information believe that there is little likelihood that the violations will recur, that the
violations are only Level III and do not warrant the inconvenience of
reporting, or that no report is needed because the violation has been remedied as, for example, by a coach directing a student-athlete to return
money given to the student-athlete by a booster.
All these reasons combine to produce perhaps the biggest, and most
intractable, impediment to reporting—an individual’s belief that a report
should be made only when an individual is certain, or nearly so, that a
violation has occurred. This conflates the initial stage of an investigation
with a post-investigation finding of culpability, a fundamental misunderstanding of what reporting signifies.
Individuals who seek certainty before reporting ignore the possibility that others also may have information relevant to a misconduct calculus. When each holder of a single piece of information fails to report,
then there is real risk that major violations will go undetected. A university is the sum total of students and staff, and it is held to know the
information of each, both individually and collectively. It gets no hall
pass from a finding of failure of institutional control, and associated penalties,76 because information was dispersed across staff members and
students rather than centralized in the hands of one person.
When a suspected violation goes unreported, the fact that someone
earlier knew something likely will sit in memory, or in a text or email,
ready later to be uncovered. A subsequent investigation, when it finally
comes, not only will amp up findings and penalties for information not
earlier shared, but the failure to report also removes a salient opportunity
for an institution to evaluate, and reform, institutional compliance and
oversight systems.77 These lost opportunities can have a cascading

PRESSLER, IT’S NOT ABOUT THE TRUTH: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE DUKE LACROSSE CASE
AND THE LIVES IT SHATTERED (2007).
76. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 19.9.3.
77. The need for effective board oversight was highlighted at least by the time of the
financial crises in the mid-2000’s. E.g., Jim Deloach, 10 Principles for Effective Board Risk
Oversight, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (June 5, 2017), http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/10-principles-for-effective-board-risk-oversight/. The issue of board oversight
also is a focus area for university administrations. The Association of Governing Boards of
Universities and Colleges (AGB), for example, has a wealth of publications and reports related
to Board accountability and risk management. A list may be found on its web page. AGB,
https://www.agb.org/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2020). It advocates ERM (effective risk management). Among its recommendations: Make risk management a priority, discuss potential risks
frequently, and assure that information is shared, especially “cross-functional” information;
ASS’N of Governing Boards of U. and Colleges, A Wake-up Call: Enterprise Risk Management at Colleges and Universities Today, AGB (2014), https://www.agb.org/sites/default/files/legacy/RiskSurvey2014.pdf.
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effect, with each of them amplifying and magnifying the overall consequences when the violations finally surface.
B. Coach Involvement in Investigations
Problems can occur even when someone reports a suspicion that
violations were committed. Perhaps the most prevalent problem is that
reports are made to someone in the athletic department other than the
compliance director. When a potential violation involves a student-athlete, or the information relates to a particular team, then the invariable
reaction is to report the matter to the head coach.78 Even if the head
coach takes no action and immediately reports the information to the
compliance director, the coach still has information about a potential violation. If an investigation concludes with no findings against the head
coach and no penalties imposed on the team, there may be questions
about the sufficiency and objectivity of that investigation and suspicions
that the head coach doctored records or coached witnesses as to what to
say. If, on the other hand, the coach conducts an inquiry, however limited, more substantial problems arise.
Coaches are problem-solvers; they care about their programs,
worry about competition consequences, and seek to protect their studentathletes. They are not trained investigators. Nonetheless, coaches who
ask questions have involved themselves in an investigation. Even a few
questions may alert others or permit them time to consider what and how
to answer when the compliance director comes to call. In consequence,
then, even a few questions may both corrupt an investigation and trigger
questions about a coach’s motives. A final problem with alerting the
head coach is that the coach may be complicit in the violations or will
actively engage in efforts to subvert an investigation.79 As a result, persons who alert a coach have put a bullseye on their foreheads. They risk
being fired, and also may be the subject of COI findings and penalties.

78. Reporting to a sports supervisor rather than the compliance director raises some of
the same issues discussed in text about head coaches. The focus is on head coaches because
they are the most likely staff members to whom reports of suspected violations will be made.
They also are the ones most likely to have their motives questioned and to have the most
invested in subverting an investigation to protect their programs. As one example, consider
Penn State. The assistant coach who witnessed Sandusky’s sexual behavior with a juvenile
reported to Head Coach Joe Paterno, and not to the compliance director or the police. See Sara
Ganim, Mike McQueary told Joe Paterno he saw something ‘extremely sexual’ between Jerry
Sandusky, young boy, PATRIOT NEWS (Dec. 16, 2011), https://www.pennlive.com/midstate/2011/12/mcqueary_says_he_sat_at_patern.html.
79. See New, supra note 62.
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C. Failure to Maintain Confidentiality in Investigations
Keeping an investigation confidential and limiting those in the
know is the best way to assure the integrity of an investigation and to
insulate later findings from skepticism and criticism. In any organization, and certainly an athletics department, keeping an investigation fully
confidential is difficult to achieve.
One reason is that people talk, no matter the admonition to keep
information confidential. Another reason is that there are people who in
the normal course of things need to know. If there are issues related to
student-athlete well-being, then the team physician or trainers may need
to be informed. An athletic director is the chief executive officer of the
athletic department and needs to know matters of significance that go on
in the department. With such knowledge, the athletic director may make
different decisions regarding job assignments that may arise. The
knowledge also may give the athletic director helpful context for understanding staff interactions. The athletic director typically is the compliance director’s reporting line, and the compliance director would find it
difficult to withhold information from the athletic director. In turn, an
athletic director will want to alert the head coach whose program is implicated.
There are very good reasons why the athletic director wants to inform the head coach. First, this is simply good management. An athletic
director needs a good working relationship with senior staff members.
Second, a head coach needs to have sufficient information to run the
team. For example, if a student-athlete’s eligibility is at risk, the head
coach may need to prepare other student-athletes to play or may need a
new recruiting strategy. Third, head coaches, particularly those with
winning records on popular teams, can generate fan and media support
and also may have connections to powerful donors and perhaps even
university trustees.80 An athletic director can ill afford to have these others believe the coach has been mistreated. Finally, the head coach may
learn through other channels about an investigation and believe the failure to inform betrays an affirmative mistrust of him rather than investigative prudence. This portends ill for the relationship between athletic
director and head coach post investigation.
80. In 2011, the Ohio State football team was investigated for NCAA violations. Gordon
Gee, the Ohio State president at the time, was asked if he was considering firing the then head
coach, Jim Tressel. Tressel’s Ohio State teams won multiple Big Ten Conference championships and a national championship. In response to the question, Gee joked, “No, are you kidding? Let me just be very clear: I’m just hopeful the coach doesn’t dismiss me.” Jim Tressel
tenders resignation, ESPN (May 30, 2011), https://www.espn.com/college-football/news/story?id=6606999. The joke had more than a gem of truth to it.
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In most cases, the risk in alerting a head coach may be offset by the
reasons for alerting the coach. When, however, there is reason to believe
that a head coach is complicit in the commission of violations, or there
is reason to believe a head coach will attempt to subvert an investigation,
the calculus changes. In that situation, the compliance director must advise the athletic director of the inadvisability of alerting the coach. A
reporting line outside athletics can assist the compliance director.81 An
outside person can reinforce the need to segregate information from a
head coach and also will have authority, or access to authority, to require
that an athletic director refrain from giving the head coach a heads up.82
D. Michigan State as Object Lesson
An object lesson of the consequences of failing to report is the sex
abuse of student-athletes at Michigan State University. Larry Nassar
was a physician on the staff of the Michigan State University College of
Medical Osteopathy and the trainer for the Michigan State women’s
gymnastics team.83 In February 2018, he was sentenced to forty to 175
years in prison for sexual assaults and misconduct perpetrated on more
than 330 victims under the guise of medical treatment.84
Beginning in 1997 with the first report, and continuing until 2016,
when Nassar’s conduct became public, at least eight student-athletes
shared concerns about Nassar to staff members at Michigan State. 85 Not
one of the student-athletes shared their concerns with the compliance
81. See What is the NCAA’s phone number?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/whatncaas-phone-number (last visited Aug. 21, 2020).
82. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
83. Jen Kirby, The sex abuse scandal surrounding USA Gymnastics team doctor Larry
Nassar, explained, VOX (May 16, 2018, 4:45 PM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/1/19/16897722/sexual-abuse-usa-gymnastics-larry-nassar-explained. Nassar also
had been a former trainer for USA Gymnastics, the governing body for Olympics Gymnastics
Competition; and a six-time winner of the Elite Gymnastic Coaches “National Contributor of
the Year” award. Tim Evans et al., How Larry Nassar abused hundreds of gymnasts and
eluded justice for decades, USA TODAY NETWORK (Apr. 4, 2018, 4:59 PM), https://www.usabreakingnews.net/2018/01/how-larry-nassar-abused-hundreds-of-gymnasts-and-eluded-justice-for-decades/.
84. Meghan Keneally, MSU agrees to pay gymnastics doctor Larry Nassar’s accusers
$500 million in settlement, ABC NEWS (May 16, 2018, 9:58 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/msu-agrees-pay-gymnastics-doctor-larry-nassarsaccusers/story?id=55208344.
85. James Dator, A comprehensive timeline of the Larry Nassar case, SBNATION (July
31, 2019, 1:24 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/2018/1/19/16900674/larry-nassar-abusetimeline-usa-gymnastics-michigan-state; Kim Kozlowski, What MSU knew: 14 were warned
of Nassar abuse, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 18, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/tech/2018/01/18/msu-president-told-nassar-complaint-2014/1042071001/;
Sarah Brown, How a Transformational President Set Michigan Stateon a Course to Disaster,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 8, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/How-a-Transformational/243369.
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director; not one of the staff members to whom they reported took their
concerns to the compliance director (or any other athletic department or
campus senior administrator).86
In 2014, a student-athlete brought a formal Title IX complaint
against Nassar.87 The Title IX investigator confined her investigation to
the four squares of the complaint.88 Had she known about the earlier
information, she might have expanded the scope of her inquiry to include
interviews with the other student-athletes and the staff members to
whom they shared concerns. Later, when the full scope of Nassar’s conduct became public, the university found no shelter in the fact that none
of the earlier student-athlete concerns had been reported to the compliance director in real time.89
The consequences to Michigan State include $500 million paid in
settlements to resolve civil litigation complaints filed by Nassar’s victims,90 a Title IX investigation into systemic failures in Michigan’s
State’s handling of Nassar information,91 a Clery Act investigation92 that
resulted in $4.5 million in fines,93 a two-year attorney general
86. Kozlowski, supra note 85.
87. Caroline Kitchener, The Nassar Investigation That Never Made Headlines,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/01/the-nassar-investigation-that-never-made-headlines/551717/.
88. See id.
89. Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, A Record Fine for Underreporting Sex Crimes, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/09/06/education-department-fines-michigan-state-45-million-not-reporting-nassar-crimes.
90. Mitch Smith & Anemona Hartocollis, Michigan State’s $500 Million for Nassar Victims Dwarfs Other Settlements, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/us/larry-nassar-michigan-state-settlement.html; Will Hobson & Cindy
Boren, Michigan State settles with Larry Nassar victims for $500 million, WASH. POST (May
16,
2018,
10:48
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/earlylead/wp/2018/05/16/michigan-state-settles-larry-nassar-lawsuits-for-500-million/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.961774416a48&wpisrc=al_news__alert-sports—alert-national&wpmk=1 (reporting that award provides $425 million to 332 Nassar victims, an average of $1.28 million per victim and $75 million in a trust to cover other victims who may
come forward, less lawyer fees of one-third); A.J. Perez, How much money will Larry Nassar
survivors get? Grim process will determine settlements, USA TODAY (May 16, 2018, 5:59
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2018/05/16/larry-nassar-survivors-sexualabuse-settlements-money/617333002/.
91. Eric Kelderman, After the Nassar Conviction, Michigan State Goes on Trial, CHRON.
OF HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/after-nassar-convictionmichigan-state-goes-on-trial/; David Jesse, Feds sending more investigators to MSU’s campus, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 26, 2018, 4:12 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2018/02/26/feds-sending-more-investigators-msu-campus/373884002/.
92. Kelderman, supra note 91; Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and
Campus Crime Statistics Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2020).
93. Tawnell D. Hobbs, Melissa Korn & Louise Radnofsky, Michigan State University
Fined $4.5 Million for Sex-Crime Reporting Failures, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 5, 2019, 1:35
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/michigan-state-university-fined-4-5-million-for-sexcrime-reporting-failures-11567698999.

108

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:61

investigation, and several other investigations.94 There also has been
untold damage to Michigan State’s reputation, and likely no good way
to assess the magnitude of that damage.
The case also has had substantial impact on individuals. The Michigan State athletic director resigned.95 The Michigan State president resigned and is being prosecuted.96 The dean of the Michigan State College of Osteopathic Medicine retired,97 foregoing emeritus status and
benefits paid to retired senior administrators.98 He since has been convicted of two misdemeanors and sentenced to one year in jail.99 The
University General Counsel, who handled an internal investigation, resigned.100 The head Women’s Gymnastics Coach resigned and since has
been convicted of lying to the police about what gymnasts told her about
Nassar.101 A doctor who consulted in the Title IX investigation resigned
in advance of being fired.102

94. David Eggert, AG suspends investigation of Michigan State over Nassar,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Dec.
24,
2019),
https://apnews.com/bb09d1bae41c718ba2b9621c6bb6dea5.
95. Dan Murphy, Michigan State AD Mark Hollis resigns, ESPN (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/22223678/michigan-state-athletic-directormark-hollis-resigns.
96. Tracy Connor, Michigan State president Lou Anna Simon resigns over Nassar scandal, NBC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2018, 3:58 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/michigan-state-president-lou-anna-simon-resigns-over-nassar-scandal-n840866. Simon is one of
fewer than twelve Michigan State faculty to hold a Hannah Professorship, expected to be
awarded only to star scholars; Sarah Brown, Michigan State’s Ex-President Now Holds a
Prestigious Professorship. Some of Her Colleagues Aren’t Happy About It, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Michigan-State-s/242644.
97. Sarah Brown, Here’s a List of Who Has Left Michigan State Since the Nassar Scandal Erupted, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Here-s-a-List-of-Who-Has/243145.
98. Kim Kozlowski, Strampel retires ahead of possible firing by MSU, DETROIT NEWS
(July 6, 2018, 11:24 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2018/07/06/strampel-retires-ahead-possible-firing-msu/762808002/.
99. Megan Banta, Former MSU dean William Strampel sentenced to one year in jail,
LANSING ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2019, 2:20 PM), https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/local/2019/08/07/former-msu-dean-william-strampel-sentenced-larry-nassar-michiganstate/1933906001/.
100. Matt Harmon, VP of Legal Affairs at MSU resigns in the wake of more Nassar-related lawsuits, MICH. DAILY (Feb. 20, 2018, 6:04 PM), https://www.michigandaily.com/section/administration/msu-vp-legal-affairs-retires-after-new-lawsuits-filed-against-university.
101. Megan Banta, Former Michigan State University gymnastics coach Kathie Klages
convicted of lying to police, LANSING ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2020, 7:00 PM), https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/local/2020/02/14/former-msu-gymnastics-coach-kathieklages-convicted-lying-police/4761128002/.
102. Mat Mencarini, MSU doctor resigned after removing Nassar patient files, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (Mar. 18, 2017, 10:01 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2017/03/17/larry-nassar-brooke-lemmen-gymnastics/99338982/.
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V. ELEMENTS OF AN INVESTIGATION
Investigations begin when the compliance director learns of potential violations. Should the compliance director decide the violations, if
proved, are Level I or Level II, the compliance director should inform
the NCAA enforcement staff. That shows an intent to cooperate. In
addition, in these days of social media and a twenty-four/seven news
cycle, the enforcement staff may hear something from another source. It
always is better for institutional compliance staff to get there first.
A. External or Internal?
Once a compliance director decides that Level I or II violations may
have been committed, university senior administrators have a choice to
make: hire external investigators to lead the investigation103 or proceed
with athletics compliance staff.104 Although there are benefits and drawbacks to either choice, common to both is that investigators must know
the elements of NCAA violations sufficiently well so that they may detect additional areas of potential violations; they must be skeptical about
information provided; they must resist accepting explanations at face
value; and they must be intrepid in pursuing uncomfortable areas of inquiry or challenging popular and forceful coaches.
Good investigations require time, diligence, testing and confirming
information, and proceeding in ways designed to be impervious to tampering.105 External investigators investigate for a living, are more experienced, and likely are better skilled in interviewing techniques. They
also will not be hampered by prior relationships with investigation targets and other witnesses and will not worry whether their skepticism and
probing will produce hurt feelings in co-workers or affect work relationships once an investigation ends. Outside investigators also are more
likely to hear corroborative tangential information that a staff member
would not want a co-worker to know. Consider a staff member having
an extramarital affair who was at a hotel when he saw a booster pay a
student-athlete. Why he was at the hotel may be information he is more
inclined to share with a stranger.
103. An investigation may be external to the athletic department, but internal to the university. At Nebraska, the FAR has the authority to remove an investigation outside the athletic
department when the FAR believes an external review is needed. See Memorandum from
UNL Chancellor, supra note 20. The FAR chairs are the review committee.
104. See id.
105. NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REP. NO. 176 (2000) (University of Minnesota). The University learned of a possible major infraction perpetuated by the
Head Basketball Coach. It alerted the head coach that team members would be interviewed.
Before interviews could be conducted, the head coach met with the team and coached them
to lie. Id.
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External investigators are more likely to satisfy outside observers
that an investigation was complete and impartial. They also may make
it easier for university and athletic administrators internally to implement recommended prophylactic measures. Finally, outside investigators will free compliance staff to continue to do all the other jobs that
need to be done.
On the flip side, compliance staff will be more familiar with athletic
department, university, and Conference policies and may well be more
familiar with the ins and outs of NCAA bylaws. They not only more
quickly can locate documents, but they are better positioned to know
what documents might exist and which staff members and boosters
might have relevant information. They also know the proclivities,
quirks, and behaviors of coaches and staff. Institutional compliance directors may cause fewer disruptions to work and student-athlete schedules as, by contrast to outside investigators, they need not fit all activity
within a tightened time frame but, instead, can schedule interviews
around work and student-athlete schedules. And, finally, institutional
compliance staff will be much less expensive than an outside investigator.106
B. Interviewing Fundamentals
No matter whether conducted by external or internal investigators,
or by both working in tandem, some components of conducting an investigation are common to all investigations. First, it is critically important to act promptly to assure that relevant documents are not lost,
removed, or destroyed.107 Second, interviews should be kept confidential;108 one of the best ways to corrupt an investigation is for information
to become known to investigation targets. Third, there always should be
two people conducting interviews. Fourth, interviews should be recorded.109
An investigator needs to decide who should be interviewed, the order in which interviews are conducted, the questions to be asked of
106. Anne Ryman, University of Arizona spends $1.4M on legal bills related to FBI basketball investigation, AZCENTRAL (Nov. 29, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-investigations/2018/11/29/arizona-wildcats-legal-billsncaa-basketball-investigation/2120399002/.
107. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 19.5.9 (Access to Information); for guidance
on document preservation, see infra note 131 and accompanying text.
108. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1 § 19.5.8.
109. There are myriad police manuals and books on the subject. See generally, e.g., JOHN
HESS, INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. 2015); JOHN R.
SCHAFER & JOE NAVARRO, ADVANCED INTERVIEWING TECHNIQUES (3d ed. 2016); DARREN
DRAKE, THE INFORMATION YOU WANT (2016); see also DAVID E. ZULAWSKI ET AL.,
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION 420 (2d ed. 2001).
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witnesses, and the order of questions. Typically, interviewers first talk
to witnesses predicted to have the most critical information because what
is learned may frame later interviews. An important early decision is
when to interview the investigation target. Although witnesses will be
told to keep the interview confidential, they nonetheless may fail to follow that admonition. Where to slot the target depends on what interviewers think is the greater risk to the integrity of the investigation.
The goal in an interview is to acquire all relevant information, of
course. To achieve that goal, interviewing is an interactive process between asking the right, and right type of, questions and being an active
listener. An active listener hears and pursues inconsistencies and identifies relevant documents and corroborating (or refuting) information not
before identified. An active listener also pays attention to what is NOT
said.
Specific questions produce specific answers that can be matched
against other information and, therefore, identify witnesses who dissemble, but they also may alert targets as to where the pitfalls are in their
answers and, in consequence, alert targets how to tailor a response. In
focusing their attention in a particular direction, specific questions may
lead even a fully cooperative witness to fail to provide other relevant
information.110
Open-ended questions, with uninterrupted time for witnesses to answer, avoid the pitfalls of specific questions. They also minimize later
claims that the witness’s information was tainted by what the interviewer
shared.111 A negative is that open-ended questions extend the time that
interviews take. Their major downside is that they risk even active listeners missing important new information or being distracted by answers
into the pathways the answers provide, thereby failing to go back over
the interview and follow up to acquire additional specific information.
The uncertainty that impedes people from making reports also leads
them to equivocate or understate when they come forward. An investigator must avoid concluding that a tepid or equivocal answer means
there is little or nothing to follow up.
A particularly bad mistake is for an investigator to decide that there
can be no case proved in a swearing contest. The scenario: one person
reports that something happened; the other denies it. That should begin
110. See, e.g., NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REP. NO. 193 at 26
(2002) (getting specific too early may permit a subject to answer a particular question honestly
but avoid answering the sense and true intent of the question).
111. See, e.g., BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 18-19 (2011) (discussing criminal law literature regarding contaminations of confessions by providing information to a suspect).
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an investigation, not end it. Investigators should seek corroborating evidence for each version and evaluate the comparative internal consistencies of the two versions and the surrounding contextual information. Not
all situations generate equally plausible sets of inferences about what
occurred. In addition, people and information are not equally credible.112
At the end of the day, even if there are just the two versions and not
much more, an investigative conclusion can be made. Consider the municipal judge who affirms a traffic ticket when the entire basis of the
evidence is the report of the police officer, contradicted by the driver.
C. The Backend Forward Approach
Every investigation worth the name must be conducted independently, fully, and fairly.113 Every investigation also must generate
confidence in others that it was conducted independently, fully, and
fairly. While these two goals appear consonant one to the other, they
may point to different conduct during an investigation.114 The point here
is a simple one: the scope and direction of an investigation at the front
end should be guided by how one would like to handle questions and
criticism at the back end of an investigation—at a COI hearing or from
the media, an academic senate, the state legislature, or various interest
groups.
Suppose it is alleged that Head Coach Touchdown paid two recruits
to attend State University, and that the university lacked institutional
control because it had no effective system in place to police against the
possibility of such conduct taking place. Coach Touchdown is a highly
successful football coach. His teams have won Conference championships and one national title. The recruits were both five-star players out
of high school, and they were integral to the 2019 national championship
State University won. If the violations are proved, Head Coach Touchdown no doubt will lose his job, the two student-athletes will be

112. Among other things, an investigator can assess the credibility of each individual with
respect to past history and reputation for truthfulness; assess the credibility in terms of the
common sense of what is being reported; assess the credibility in terms of other information
in the record; and assess the credibility in terms of reason, if any, for dissembling.
113. See Elizabeth C. Tippett, Why companies like Wells Fargo ignore their whistleblowers – at their peril, CONVERSATION (Oct. 24, 2016, 12:09 AM), http://Theconversation.Com/Why-Companies-Like-Wells-Fargo-Ignore-Their-Whistleblowers -At-Their-Peril67501. Surprisingly, perhaps, that is not always what occurs.
114. See, e.g., Geri Ann S. Baptista, Managing reputational risk: Why lawyers and PR
professionals should be friends, THOMSON REUTERS (Aug./Sept. 2012), https://store.legal.thomsonreuters.com/law-products/news-views/corporate-counsel/managing-reputational-risk-why-lawyer-and-pr-professionals-should-be-friends.
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ineligible to compete, the national championship will be vacated, and
there will be team scholarship limits going forward.115
An institutional investigation ensues. One conclusion of the investigators is that Head Coach Touchdown made the payments. A second
conclusion is that the university both adequately monitored the football
program and exercised institutional control. To reach the second conclusion, the investigators decided that Touchdown acted without the
knowledge or connivance of any other person in the athletic department
and that he cleverly circumvented athletic department policies reasonably calculated to detect violations. It is predictable that Touchdown will
publicly criticize these conclusions and claim that the university abandoned his interests to protect its own. Fans, donors, and media representatives also may challenge the merits and motives of the university’s
position.
The university at the backend will want to demonstrate that it provided procedural fairness to Coach Touchdown during the investigation.
One thing investigators should attempt to do at the front end is to accede
to all Coach Touchdown’s requests for documents and for witnesses that
the university should interview, even if the requests are time consuming
and even if the investigators believe the requests are designed to delay
the conclusion of the investigation. The investigators also should document all coach requests and their responses to them. If the investigators
refuse a request, for fear it will jeopardize the investigation, or because
they believe the coach has been deliberately and repetitively attempting
to thwart or stall the investigation, then the investigators should create a
full record demonstrating why the request was denied.
D. Follow-up, Especially When Investigation Ends with No Finding of
Culpability
It falls to compliance staff to assure that there is adequate followup post investigation even, and perhaps especially, if there are no findings of violations. Return to Michigan State and the 2014 Title IX complaint filed against Larry Nassar. After a four-month investigation, Kristine Moore, the Michigan State Assistant Director for Institutional
Equity, found insufficient evidence that Title IX was violated.116 At the
same time, she accepted as true much of what the student-athlete said
about how Nassar performed the procedure, and she recommended
115. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 19.9.5 (discussing core penalties for Level I and
Level II violations).
116. Jean Casarez et al., She filed a complaint against Larry Nassar in 2014. Nothing
happened, CNN (Feb. 1, 2018, 5:53 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/01/us/msu-amandathomashow-complaint-larry-nassar/index.html.
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prophylactic measures to cabin potential liability arising out of the procedure and to make the procedure more patient-sensitive.117 Her recommendations were not implemented. 118
William Strampel, the dean of the College of Medical Osteopathy
who was Nassar’s supervisor outside athletics, also made post-Report
recommendations.119 He did not take steps to assure Nassar complied.120
The failure to follow up post-investigation when there is no finding
of culpability at best confounds a finding of failure of proof with a finding that the violations did not occur. Such a failure of follow-up would
be a significant element, perhaps even determinative, in a showing of
lack of institutional control should a later infractions case develop.
VI. WHAT TO INCLUDE IN A COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN121
Effective risk management requires advance planning. This section
describes some of the most critical elements in a plan.

117. Moore advised that Nassar’s treatment should be carefully explained, that there be
explicit patient consent, that a third person be present during the treatments, and that Nassar
offer patients a choice between skin-on-skin and over the clothes manipulation of breast or
pelvic floor area, unless skin on skin was medically necessary. She also recommended that
Michigan State consider providing an information sheet to a patient in advance of treatment
and include a disclaimer. Matt Mencarini, MSU hid full conclusions of 2014 Nassar report
from victim, LANSING ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2018, 4:23 PM), https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/local/2018/01/26/michigan-state-larry-nassar-title-ix/1069493001.
118. See id.
119. Megan Banta, William Strampel first Michigan State official tied to Larry Nassar to
be convicted, USA TODAY (June 12, 2019, 2:31 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/education/2019/06/12/william-strampel-michigan-state-university-msusexual-assault-jury/1433882001/ (stating that Strampel told Nassar to wear gloves and have
someone else present); Julie Mack, MSU colleagues initially defended Nassar, according to
police
investigation,
MICH.
LIVE
(Jan.
30,
2019),
https://www.mlive.com/news/2018/04/msu_colleagues_initially_defen.html.
120. The Associated Press, Michigan State dean charged, accused of harassing students,
OBSERVER-DISPATCH
(Mar.
27,
2018,
12:30
PM),
https://www.uticaod.com/news/20180327/michigan-state-dean-charged-accused-of-harassing-students.
121. Several years ago, the athletic directors in the NCAA Division I FBS (formerly called
D-IA) worked on a plan for athletic department compliance. The plan was never adopted. Its
components cover the subjects discussed in this article. See D-IA Athletics Directors Ass’n
Compliance and Enforcement Task Force, Standards for Effective Compliance and Risk Management Programs Maintaining Institutional Control, (June 5, 2013) (on file with author). A
complete risk management plan also will include protocols for how to handle media and other
external constituencies during the period of an investigation and post-investigation. This component will be the responsibility of university and athletic department high administrators and
involves interaction with legal counsel and media relations experts. It therefore is outside the
scope of this article.
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A. The Staff Reporting Obligation
Because the prime impediment to prompt discovery and handling
of violations is that individuals with information about violations do not
report, a prime focus in a risk management plan is to enhance the likelihood that coaches and staff will report. Protocols should include:
1. Periodic education of all staff so that they understand their behavioral and reporting responsibilities regarding operative legal, campus, NCAA, Conference, and Athletic Department rules and policies. These education sessions should include:
a. Regular compliance unit meetings with compliance staff
and academic eligibility certifying staff members within the
athletic department and on the greater campus.
b. Specific education for coaches and staff on NCAA, Conference, and Athletic Department rules and policies as they directly affect them.
c. A clear statement that the first priority of staff is to the university and athletic department, not particular coaches, staff,
or student-athletes.
2. Regular training and written directives in the athletic department
compliance manual that cover the obligation to report suspected violations, including:
a. A clear statement that suspected NCAA violations need to
be reported to the compliance director, and only the compliance director.
b. A clear statement that a report to anyone other than the compliance director, including the head coach of a sport, does
not satisfy a reporting obligation.
c. A clear statement that a failure to report triggers employment consequences that may include termination.
d. A clear statement that a staff member or coach who suspects
a violation was committed should not investigate before reporting, even to ask a few questions.
e. A clear statement that a report must be made even if the violation was thwarted before its completion or action was
taken to remedy the violation.
f. A clear statement that a report must be made even if the conduct does not relate to the staff member’s athletic unit.
g. A clear statement that a report must be made when a staff
member has a reasonable suspicion that a violation was
committed. When in doubt, ask. When in doubt, report.
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B. Compliance Staff Treatment of Reports
Compliance staff must make judgments regarding the extent to
which follow up is required based on information reported or otherwise
acquired. Some grounds rules include:
1. Compliance staff must regularly check traditional, non-traditional,
and social media for information about student-athletes and coaches.
NCAA enforcement staff do so, and compliance staff should be forearmed.122
2. Compliance staff should not discount information because of its
source, or because the individual reporting seems to be uncertain, or
to equivocate.
3. All reports of potential violations are not equal. The obligation to
conduct a full investigation increases when:
a. The person reporting is someone the compliance staff perceives to be trustworthy. This does not mean that information from a less reliable source should be ignored. It
simply reflects a commonplace that the more reliable the
source is perceived to be, the more seriously the compliance
staff should treat the information.
b. The suspected violation concerns a high-profile program (or
coach or student-athlete), or the matter potentially will have
an impact on student-athlete eligibility. The likelihood of
media and other public scrutiny increases in these cases and,
therefore, so too, the need for a full investigation.
c. The suspected violation is Level I or Level II. The need for
a full investigation is increased even when the information
reported is relatively unspecific.
d. The information provided is detailed.
e. The person who reports has first-hand knowledge of the suspected violation (as compared to reporting hearsay).
f. The person who reports describes more than one instance of
suspected violations.
g. More than one person reports the same potential violation.
h. More than one person reports different potential violations
committed by the same coach or in the same sport.

122. See, e.g., Andy Staples, Cheating for Dummies: Your guide to smarter NCAA rulebreaking, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 5, 2011), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/andy_staples/07/05/cheating-for-dummies/index.html.
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C. Minimal Requisites for Conducting an Investigation
Investigations require thought and planning in advance. Protocols
setting minimum standards assure that certain requisites always will be
followed and that there will be consistency across investigations.
1. Get to the documents as soon as possible.
2. Speak to IT regarding retrieval of deleted work computer files and
the extent to which there is evidence of phone and text messages and
whether they may be retrieved. If a staff member or coach is an
investigative target, then consider seizing the computer.
3. Seize phone records and emails on university accounts.
4. Request all phone numbers and emails. Dates and times and recipients of phone and email and text messages, as well as exchanges
between recipients and others, can tell a tale independent of the content of the messages.123
5. Ask about personal phone records—other cell phones owned by
staff, cell phones of family members. Search for other social media
information.
6. Plan the sequence of interviews and questions before beginning interviews. Cast a wide net to see who might have information. Often
there are pockets of information in various hands. Do not forget
secretaries, equipment managers, trainers, custodians, and other
non-administrative staff members. They often are best positioned to
hear information.
7. Have two people at every interview that may be significant; if possible, have two people at every interview. Ideally, the second person
should be someone outside athletics.
8. Tape record interviews. Remember that the interview is being recorded and later may be heard by others, including NCAA enforcement staff. Do not turn the tape on and off. It raises questions as to
what might have been said when the tape was off. If the interviewee
refuses to be taped, tape the refusal. But now it is imperative to have
an outside person be one of the two people who conduct the interview.
9. Interview witnesses separately. Group sessions corrupt the information that any one individual may provide.124 They also may lead
123. See, e.g., INFRACTIONS REP. NO. 193, supra note 110; see also NCAA DIV. I COMM.
ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REP. NO. 323 at 11-13, 23-27 (2010) (University of Southern
California).
124. There is considerable research on eyewitness identification, and how one witness can
influence another. See generally, e.g., Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L.
765 (1995); Howard Eisenberg & Bruce Feustal, Criminal Law: Pretrial Identification: An
Attempt to Articulate Constitutional Criteria, 58 MARQ. L. Rev. 659, 673 (1975).
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more reticent individuals, and those with embarrassing information,
to remain silent.
Be skeptical. People lie. People have faulty memories.
Do not assume that records and forms always tell an accurate tale.
People sometimes keep bad records. People sometimes lie in records.
Create a record as the investigation proceeds that summarizes what
is occurring, including memos to the file explaining investigative
decisions made, why, and who was consulted.
Be prepared to conduct second and even third interviews as new
matters are uncovered.
VII. CONCLUSION
125

Dean Smith, the longtime head coach of the North Carolina University men’s basketball team, said of intercollegiate athletics that,
“[a]thletics is to the university like the front porch is to a home. It is the
most visible part, yet certainly not the most important.” 126
No doubt high-profile teams and head coaches sit on the front porch
and affect a university’s reputation. No doubt losses by a football team,
particularly in a major football program, can rock the porch, dominate
public and media discussion, affect donor contributions, and even involve public officials in a discussion about what to do. Equally no doubt,
NCAA violations and student-athlete behavioral issues can rock the
front porch and cause long-term injury to the academic reputation and
status of a university.
Universities have an absolute obligation as NCAA members to
maintain control of their athletic programs. Institutional compliance directors are the athletic administrators with first-line responsibility to see
that this happens. They are responsible for NCAA rules education, compliance form creation and management, rules interpretation, waivers, investigations, and reporting potential NCAA violations.127 They also act
as liaisons to campus processes that include Title IX investigations and
student discipline, and they are the point persons for student wellbeing
and behavioral issues.128 Many of these “hot button” matters bring public scrutiny and criticism. No doubt, then, institutional compliance directors also sit on the front porch.
125. Michael Levy, Dean Smith, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Dean-Smith (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
126. Maximize Marketing in College Athletics, FRONT PORCH ATHLETICS,
https://www.frontporchathletics.com/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2020)..
127. See supra Part II.
128. See supra Part II.
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This article described the nuts and bolts of the institutional compliance job. It then focused on a prime factor for problems on the institutional control part of the front porch—the failure of those with information about violations to report that information to the compliance
director—and explained why individuals fail to report. Finally, it offered guidance on how to keep the front porch sturdy. In other words, it
offered guidance on how to increase the likelihood of reports being
made, as well as guidance on the minimal requisites of a violation investigation, and the prime elements of a compliance risk management plan.
The front porch is visible, yes. With visibility comes scrutiny and
the potential for considerable, and protracted, second-guessing and criticism for how universities oversee their front porch.129 Universities have
every incentive to avoid being overwhelmed by the front porch. What
compliance directors do, and how they do it, can either enhance the
chances for a well-built and sturdy front porch. Or not.

129. See, e.g., Ted Mitchell, Higher education must clean out its ‘front porch’, WASH.
POST (Apr. 25, 2018, 1:35 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/gradepoint/wp/2018/04/25/higher-education-must-clean-out-its-front-porch/; see generally, e.g.,
Frank G. Splitt, Time for accountability in sports, The NAT’L CATHOLIC REP., Nov. 14, 2008;
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